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5. This entire issue is of importance to the DCI because neither the operator (USAF) or ASD/SA are explicitly considering the system factors essential to intelligence purposes. USAF is using the attrition figures to prove that both vehicles are essential. ASD/SA is using operating scenarios and failing to place any value on the difference in sensor characteristics or uncertainties in probable attrition calculations.

6. All of this assumes that the intelligence requirements stated by DIA in the study are sacred and without alternatives or options.

7. From an intelligence objectives standpoint, the choice between the USAF and ASD/SA position is clear. US Intelligence will lose an advantage in future flexibility (1971-72 time period) against South China as well as other China contingencies if the 154 program is halted.

The disadvantage in the USAF position continues to be the procurement rate of the older and less capable 147 series vehicles.

8. If the DCI desires to comment to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the ASD/A on this study, I suggest that we prepare a memo including ☐ views.

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A/D/DCI/NIPE

Attachment:

References A. and B.

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cc: ☐ w/attach
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